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Abstract. Two methods to implement privacy in network communica-
tion, anonymity and DCSC (data confidentiality and secure computa-
tion) are analysed and compared in regard to privacy in mobile agent
applications. It is illustrated that privacy through DCSC is more suit-
able in mobile agent applications. To support this conclusion, privacy is
concretely implemented in a bidding mobile agent scheme in this paper.
Success of this example demonstrates that privacy can be practically
achieved in mobile agent applications through DCSC without compro-
mising the advantage of mobile agent.
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1 Introduction
Mobile agents [9, 8, 19, 20] are autonomous software entities that relay code, data
and state through multiple nodes. Usually, an originator generates the mobile
agent and sends it out to collect data, which is then used by the originator for a
special purpose. The advantage of mobile agent is that it is a real-time service,
so can visit dynamically chosen nodes to collect data instantly. For example,
with the help of a bidding mobile agent, a buyer (seller) can instantly get the
bids from a dynamic set of bidders. Then he can immediately choose one bid as
the winning bid. Compared to the traditional e-auction schemes [12, 15, 17], a
bidding-mobile-agent-based auction is more instant, flexible and convenient.
Usually, compared to traditional network applications like traditional e-
auction and e-voting [14, 2, 10, 11], a mobile agent application has the following
properties.
– Dynamic: the nodes in the communication network are usually temporally
connected terminals fitted with a relay function.
– Instant: network service must be available instantly without preparation or
delay.
– Flexible: various nodes and communication patterns may be involved.
With these properties, mobile agent has its advantage in circumstances where
dynamic and instant network services are needed. Without these properties,
mobile agent has no advantage over the traditional network applications.
As the nodes usually may want to conceal their personal privacy in mobile
agent applications, in certain cases no node may permit his identity to be linked
to his data. More precisely, a node’s privacy is the unlinkability between his
identity and his data. A definition of privacy in a mobile agent application is as
follows.
Definition 1 A mobile agent application is private if no node’s data can be
linked to its identity.
For example, a bidding mobile agent application is private if except for the win-
ner no bidder can be linked to its bid. The only known private mobile agent
schemes are [19, 20], two bidding agents. In [19, 20], privacy is implemented
through anonymity of the nodes, a method which is inefficient and inconsistent
with the properties and advantages of mobile agent application. So designing
practical privacy mechanism in mobile agent application is a challenging task.
The design must take into account the important fact that as a real-time net-
work application mobile agent has its advantages, which should not be sacrificed
in the implementation of privacy.
In this paper, a new privacy mechanism is proposed in mobile agent scheme.
The new mechanism, called DCSC, employs data confidentiality and secure com-
putation to achieve privacy in network communication. Basing privacy on data
confidentiality and secure computation is not a new idea. For example, it is
widely applied to traditional network applications like electronic auction [12, 15]
and e-voting [10, 11]. Although this privacy mechanism has not been applied to
mobile agent schemes, it has some advantages in regard to mobile agent over the
privacy mechanism based on anonymity. The DCSC privacy mechanism is more
efficient and does not conflict with the advantages of mobile agent applications.
So it is more suitable to mobile agent than the privacy mechanism based on
anonymity. DCSC is applied to a new bidding mobile agent scheme with the
same circumstance as [19, 20]. The new bidding mobile agent scheme illustrates
that privacy can be practically achieved in mobile agent applications without
compromising its advantages.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, privacy in
network communication is analysed and two privacy mechanisms are compared.
It is shown that DCSC privacy has its advantages in some applications. In Sec-
tion 3, it is illustrated that DCSC privacy is more suitable for privacy in mobile
agent and often the only feasible solution for private mobile agent application.
In Section 4, secure computation techniques are introduced to support DCSC.
Especially, an efficient secure computation technique to be used later in the pa-
per, ciphertext comparison, is recalled. In Section 5, a concrete application of
DCSC privacy in mobile agent, private bidding mobile agent, is designed on the
base of ciphertext comparison. In Section 7, the paper is concluded.
2 Privacy in Network Communication
A communication network is composed of a few nodes and used to transmit
messages through the nodes. There are many security requirements on network
communication. This paper focuses on one of them, privacy, a property widely
desired in network applications.
Definition 2 Network communication is private if no node in the network can
be linked to his data transmitted in the network.
This unlinkability in network communication is frequently required. For example,
on-line buyers using e-cash [5], on-line bidders in e-auction [12, 15, 17] and on-
line voters in e-voting [10, 11] do not want to be linked to the items they buy,
their bids and their votes respectively.
There are two methods to implement privacy in a communication network:
anonymity and DCSC (data confidentiality and secure computation). Anonymity
of a node requires that the identity of the node or its other identification infor-
mation like IP address or geographic location is concealed. Anonymity ensures
that no node is identified, not to mention to be linked to any data. Under DCSC,
all the data are always confidential (encrypted) even when being processed such
that no identification can be linked to any data in plaintext.
The idea of the anonymity mechanism is simple: if a party is anonymous,
his behaviour cannot be linked to his identity. To implement anonymity of a
party, a pseudonym for him and untraceability of his data are usually necessary.
The party can use the pseudonym to label his data such that his identity does
not appear in the network communication. The data in the network communi-
cation must be untraceable such that any data cannot be linked to its owner
by tracing it back to its origin (e.g. address of its owner). Another role of the
pseudonym is that recoverable pseudonym can be designed such that anonymity
can be revoked by recovering the corresponding identity from a pseudonym. The
only known practical method to implement untraceability is mix network [1,
7]. A mix network is an additional communication network interleaving with
the existing communication network, whose role is to relay and shuffle the data
transmitted between any two nodes in the existing communication such that
data transmission in the existing communication network becomes untraceable.
Although the idea of the anonymity mechanism is simple and direct, it has the
following drawbacks.
– Anonymity is difficult to achieve in special applications with certain com-
munication patterns. For example, implementation of privacy is difficult be-
tween neighbouring nodes when relay communication pattern is employed.
Mobile agent is such an example. When a mobile agent visits a node, the
node excutes the agent to determine the next node to relay the agent to. So
each node definitely knows the identity of the next node.
– Pseudonym is usually implemented through special signature schemes like
blind signature, group signature or ring signature. Especially, when authen-
tication is required, complex and inefficient group signature [4] or ring sig-
nature must be employed. Compared to normal signature schemes, these
signature schemes require costly set-up, complex maintenance, inefficient
generation and verification and intensive network communication.
– Mix network needs additional network communication interleaving with the
existing network communication, which may affect or even conflict with the
existing network communication. For example, when the existing network
communication is temporal, instant and dynamic, it is inconsistent with mix
network, which is not always temporally or instantly available and requires
setting up beforehand and verification afterwards. Moreover, mix network is
inefficient (especially when its correctness is required to be publicly verifi-
able) and needs intensive network communication.
DCSC is composed of two key cryptographic techniques: data confidentiality
through encryption and secure computation of the encrypted data without re-
vealing them. Under DCSC, data in the communication network are encrypted
(with a semantically secure encryption algorithm1) and never decrypted. Af-
ter the encrypted data is transmitted and collected and the network commu-
nication finishes, the encrypted data may be processed and used for a certain
purpose. When the data is processed, a secure computation technique [18, 15,
16] is employed to compute a required function of the data without decrypting
them. Although all the encrypted data is traceable and labelled with its owner’s
identity, they are kept confidential for ever. So no party can be linked to any
known data (in plaintext). Note that the secure computation takes place after
the network communication finishes and out of the communication network, so
is independent of the network.
Data confidentiality can be easily and efficiently implemented as any seman-
tically secure encryption algorithm can be employed. Complexity and cost of
secure computation depends on which function of the data is computed. Usually,
a general secure computation solution to compute any function is less efficient,
while secure computation solution to certain functions are more efficient. With
the progress in secure computation techniques, more and more functions can
be efficiently computed with encrypted inputs. Another advantage of DCSC is
that data confidentiality is achieved. As in some applications, it is desired to
conceal the statistic information of the data, data confidentiality is needed even
if anonymity has been implemented to prevent the link between the data and
their owners.
Both privacy mechanisms are widely employed in cryptographic applications.
Anonymity-based privacy is more popular in e-cash [5], while DCSC privacy is
employed in most private e-auction schemes [12, 15] (the only known anonymity-
based private e-auction is [17].). In e-voting, both anonymity-based privacy [14,
2] and DCSC privacy [10, 11] are common. When choosing which privacy mech-
anism to use, the following factors should be considered.
– Semantically secure encryption is much simpler and more efficient than group
signature or ring signature, which require costly operation both before and
during the network communication.
1 An encryption algorithm is semantically-secure if given a ciphertext c and two mes-
sages m1 and m2, such that c = E(mi) where i = 1 or 2, there is no polynomial
algorithm to find out i.
– Mix network is inefficient and needs an additional interleaving network ser-
vice, which may affect or even compromise the existing network.
– Secure computation is independent of the communication network, so brings
no side effect to communication.
– Appropriate and efficient secure computation technique is necessary for suc-
cess of DCSC.
So, if secure computation of the function of the data is relatively efficient, or the
pseudonym technique or mix network is inconsistent with the existing communi-
cation, or data confidentiality is desired, DCSC instead of the anonymity-based
privacy mechanism should be applied.
3 Privacy in Mobile Agent Applications
Privacy is important in mobile agent like in other network applications. As stated
before, the advantage of mobile agent over traditional network applications is
that it is a temporal, dynamic, instant and flexible real-time service. Unlike
traditional network services, a mobile agent application does not involve prepa-
ration or setting-up work, long-lasting network connection or communication
delay. A mobile agent can instantly travel through temporal network connection
and implement a certain application without any interference or delay. Without
this advantage, mobile agent is useless. For example, if real-time service is not
required, traditional e-auction and e-voting scheme are more mature, stable and
reliable than bidding agent and voting agent.
In the known private mobile agent applications [19, 20], privacy is imple-
mented through anonymity of the nodes. However, in the privacy implementa-
tion in [19, 20] only pseudonym is covered while untraceability, a more essential
primitive, is not mentioned. So these privacy implementations are incomplete
and unreliable. Careful study shows that implementing privacy in mobile agent
application through anonymity is unsuitable and in most cases infeasible. Be-
sides the efficiency concern caused by group (ring) signature and mix network,
the following drawbacks demonstrate that anonymity-based privacy is inconsis-
tent with mobile agent.
– Group signature and ring signature require every participant to register at a
certain time before the network communication starts, which is contradictory
to the requirement of instant service in mobile agent applications.
– An additional mix network is involved in the communication. If the mix
network is not ready between any two neighbouring nodes, communication
fails. Note that a mix network is not often available locally at any tempo-
ral time and dynamic location (in many cases, it is impossible to set up a
mix network instantly at a certain given location.). On the other hand, mo-
bile agent employs the relay communication pattern and requires instantly
available local relay communication service. Even if a local mix network is
instantly available, the relay communication pattern still reveals information
about address or location between neighbouring nodes. Moreover, shuffling
in a mix network is essentially a batch operation instead of a instant service.
So the dynamic and instant behaviour of the mobile agent application must
depend on mix network, a service not dynamically or instantly available.
This is a serious inconsistency.
– Generation of group signature and ring signature is less efficient than normal
encryption or signature generation. Additionally, group signature and ring
signature produce longer messages. So the nodes with limited computation
capability and wireless communication with limited bandwidth cannot afford
this additional computation and communication.
On the other hand, DCSC is suitable for privacy in mobile agent. Data con-
fidentiality is efficient to implement using encryption. Data confidentiality does
not increase communication burden. Although secure computation brings addi-
tional computation and communication, it does not delay the communication.
With progress of secure computation technology [16], efficient secure computa-
tion is possible in many mobile agent applications. The most important fact is
that DCSC does not compromise the advantages of mobile agent. As a result,
DCSC is a better solution to privacy than anonymity in mobile agent applica-
tions.
4 Secure Computation
Secure computation techniques are essential for DCSC privacy, so are introduced
in this section. Secure computation [18, 15, 16, 13] is also called multiparty com-
putation or secure evaluation in some literature. Its role is to compute a function
with encrypted inputs. The private key is shared by multiple parties such that
no input can be decrypted under a threshold trust assumption. The function is
evaluated by the multiple parties such that the function result is obtained while
no input is revealed. It is demonstrated in [13] that any Boolean function with
a circuit of linear size can be efficienctly evaluated without revealing the inputs,
while a function with a k bit output can be deduced to k Boolean functions. Cur-
rent secure computation techniques [15, 13] can provide solution to a wide range
of functions. So DCSC can be generally implemented in mobile agent schemes
in many application. Function-oriented special evaluation techniques can be em-
ployed to improve efficiency. For example, addition through secure computation
is very efficient with the help of an additive homomorphic encryption algorithm2.
In another example, e-auction, both general secure computation techniques [15,
13] and more efficient specially-purposed secure computation techniques [12]
have been proposed to process the encrypted bids without decrypting them in
recent private auction schemes.
The millionaire problem is the most intensively studied function in secure
computation. When Yao [18] first proposed secure computation, he studied the
millionaire problem as an example. In the millionaire problem, two ciphertexts
2 An encryption with encryption function E() is additive homomorphic if
E(m1)E(m2) = E(m1 +m2)
are compared without being decrypted to determine which encrypts a larger
message. So solution to the millionaire problem is called ciphertext comparison.
The millionaire problem is important as many complex computations can be
deduced to it. In this paper, ciphertext comparison is employed to achieve privacy
in a bidding mobile agent scheme. In the recent years, progress has been made
in finding an efficient solution to the millionaire problem. The most efficient
verifiable ciphertext comparison technique so far is proposed in [16], which is
efficient enough for practical applications.
In [16], two L-bit messages m1 and m2 are bitwise encrypted and then com-
pared as follows.
1. The two messages m1 and m2 are represented bit by bit as
(m1,1,m1,2, . . . ,m1,L) and (m2,1,m2,2, . . . ,m2,L).
2. The two messages are bitwise encrypted c1 = (c1,1, c1,2, . . . , c1,L) =
(E(m1,1), E(m1,2), . . . , E(m1,L)) and c2 = (c2,1, c2,2, . . . , c2,L) =
(E(m2,1), E(m2,2), . . . , E(m2,L)) where E() is a additive homomorphic
encryption algorithm. The private key is shared by multiple participants
such that any decryption is possible only when the number of cooperating
participants is over a threshold.
3. c1 and c2 are sent to the participants, who are required to test whether
(D(c1,1) = 1 ∧D(c2,1) = 0) ∨
(D(c1,1) = D(c2,1) ∧D(c1,2) = 1 ∧D(c2,2) = 0) ∨ . . . ∨ (1)
(D(c1,1) = D(c2,1) ∧D(c1,2) = D(c2,2) ∧ . . . ∧D(c1,L−1) = D(c2,L−1)
∧D(c1,L) = 1 ∧D(c2,L) = 0)
without decrypting any bit encryption. m1 > m2 if and only if logic test (1)
returns TRUE.
4. The participants exploits homomorphism of the encryption algorithm and
use two cryptographic primitives, batch verification and zero test, to test
D(c1,1/(E(1)c2,1)) = 0 ∨ D(c1,1/c2,1)t1(c1,2/(E(1)c2,2))t2 = 0 ∨
. . . ∨ D(∏L−1i=1 (c1,i/c2,i)ti)(c1,L/(E(1)c2,L))tL ) = 0 (2)
where t1, t2, . . . , tL are randomly chosen. Logic test (2) is equivalent to logic
test (1). If and only if logic test (2) returns TRUE, the participants declare
m1 > m2. Details of batch verification and zero test are described in [16].
It is proved in [16] that the ciphertext comparison technique is correct and sound:
m1 > m2 if and only if the zero test in (2) returns true. It is also illustrated in [16]
that the ciphertext comparison technique is private: if the colluding participants
are not over the sharing threshold of the private key, no information about
m1 or m2 is revealed except which one is larger. In this paper, the ciphertext
comparison technique above is denoted as CC(c1, c2).
5 Implementation of DCSC Privacy in Bidding Mobile
Agent Scheme
In this section, DCSC privacy mechanism is implemented in a typical mobile
agent application: bidding mobile agent. A bidding agent is generated and sent
out by an originator to sell or buy an item. It migrates to multiple bidding
nodes to collect their price quotes, and is free to choose its next move dynam-
ically based on the data it acquired from its journey. The agent finally returns
to the originator with the bids of all the bidders. Then the originator chooses a
winning offer (bid). As the bidding nodes usually want to conceal their personal
privacy, no node permits his identity to be linked to his bid. So privacy is nec-
essary in the application of bidding mobile agent. The existing bidding mobile
agent schemes with privacy are [19] and [20]. As stated before, these two schemes
employ anonymity mechanism to implement privacy, which is incomplete, unre-
liable and inefficient.
A new bidding mobile agent scheme is designed, which employs DCSC to
implement privacy. In the new scheme, there are an originator, some potential
bidders and a third party. It is assumed that originator and the third party do not
collude. The originator sends out a mobile agent to visit the nodes to collect bids.
The mobile agent finally returns to the originator with encrypted bids from all
the bidders. The function for the originator to compute is to find out the highest
or lowest bid from all the encrypted bids without decrypting them. Namely, he
has to find out the ciphertexts encrypting the largest or smallest message from
multiple ciphertexts by executing secure computation with the third party. His
task is similar to the auctioneer’s task in e-auction schemes [15, 12]. However, the
secure computation techniques in these traditional auction schemes cannot be
employed in mobile agent schemes. The general secure computation techniques
in the existing auction schemes [15] are too inefficient. The specially-purposed
secure computation techniques in the existing auction schemes [12] require each
bidder to make a choice for every biddable price in his bid. This bid format causes
high computational cost for bid encryption and heavy burden for communication.
Fortunately, the function for the originator to compute in a bidding mobile agent
application can be implemented through repeated ciphertext comparisons. If the
encrypted bids are compared pair by pair, the highest or lowest bid can be found.
The ciphertext-comparison-based secure computation is implemented between
the originator and the third party (e.g. a hardware like smart-card), who do not
collude with each other. More precisely, the third party shares the private key
with the originator and cooperates with the originator to perform the ciphertext
comparison on the encrypted bids pair by pair. As the ciphertext comparison
technique in [16] is publicly verifiable, the third party does not need to be trusted
in regard to correctness of computation. Nothing is revealed to the originator
except the comparison result as the ciphertext comparison technique in [16] is
private if the third party does not collude with the originator.
The new private bidding mobile agent scheme is described in Figure 1 where
A is the third party, O is the originator and Bi is the ith bidder. To suit the
ciphertext comparison technique in [16], the bids are bitwise encrypted. The
symbols to be used in this section are as follows.
B1
O
B2
Bn
B3
A
......
Ad-hoc network
The agent
collects the 
encrypted bids
ciphertext 
comparison
Compare the
encrypted bids
in pairs
encrypted
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Result
Fig. 1. DCSC private bidding mobile agent
– p and q are large primes such that p = 2q + 1.
– G is the cyclic subgroup in of Zp with order q and g is a generator of G.
– L is the bit length of a bid.
The new bidding mobile agent scheme is as follows.
1. Publishing public key
An additive homomorphic encryption scheme is chosen. The third party
chooses private key x1 from Zq and publishes his public key y1 = gx1 . The
originator chooses his private key x2 from Zq and publishes his public key
y2 = gx2 .
2. Starting a mobile agent
The originator generates a mobile agent, which will visit the potential bidders
and collect their bids. The public key for data encryption, y1y2, is published
in the agent, while the corresponding private key is shared by the originator
and the third party.
3. Visiting the potential bidders
When the mobile agent arrives at a potential bidder, the bidder encrypts,
signs and submits his bid to the agent. The ith bidder Bi chooses a bid bi
with bitwise representation (bi,1, bi,2, . . . , bi,L). He then encrypts his bid into
ci = (ci,1, ci,2, . . . , ci,L) where ci,k = (ai,k, bi,k) = (gri,k , gbi,k(y1y2)ri,k) for
k = 1, 2, . . . , L. Note this encryption is a variant of ElGamal encryption. Its
difference from a standard ElGamal encryption is:
– the public key is y1y2, so the corresponding private key is x1+x2, which
is shared by the third party and the originator;
– decryption of ciphertext (a, b) is logg(b/a
x1+x2)
This modified ElGamal encryption is bitwise and additively homomorphic,
so consistent with the ciphertext comparison technique in [16], which will
be employed later to compare the encrypted bids. Although decryption of
this modified ElGamal encryption algorithm requires computation of discrete
logarithm, the computation of discrete logarithm is easy as the message is a
bit.
4. Determining winning bid and winner
When the mobile agent returns to the originator, it brings n encrypted bids
c1, c2, . . . , cn. The originator compares them in pairs to find the winning
bid using the ciphertext comparison technique described in Section 4. For
example, after n − 1 comparisons, the highest or lowest bid can be found.
Note that all the bids are additively homomorphically encrypted bit by bit,
so is consistent with the ciphertext comparison technique. Comparison of
two encrypted bids ci and cj is as follows.
(a) The originator randomly chooses Ri,k and Rj,k for k = 1, 2, . . . , L
from Zq. He then calculates c′i = (c
′
i,1, c
′
i,2, . . . , c
′
i,L) and c
′
j =
(c′j,1, c
′
j,2, . . . , c
′
j,L) where
c′i,k = (a
′
i,k, b
′
i,k) = (g
Ri,kaπ(i),k, (y1y2)Ri,kbπ(i),k)
c′j,k = (a
′
j,k, b
′
j,k) = (g
Rj,kaπ(j),k, (y1y2)Rj,kbπ(j),k)
and π() is a permutation of {i, j}. Finally, he sends c′i and c′j to the
third party. Namely the originator re-encrypts and shuffles ci and cj and
sends them to the third party. The oroginator demonstrates that D(c′i)
and D(c′j) is a permutation of D(ci) and D(cj) without revealing the
permutation by proving
(logg a
′
i,1/ai,1 = logy1y2 b
′
i,1/bi,1 ∧ logg a′i,2/ai,2 = logy1y2 b′i,2/bi,2 ∧ . . .
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logg a
′
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j,2/bi,2 ∧ . . . ∧ logg a′j,L/ai,L = logy1y2 b′j,L/bi,L)
This proof can be simplified using batch verification technique [3] into
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where tk and t′k are short integers randomly chosen by the originator.
Proof (3) can be implemented using ZK proof of equality of logarithm [5]
and ZK proof of partial knowledge [6]. The proof can be publicly verified
by anyone.
(b) The third party re-encrypts and shuffles c′i and c
′
j . He randomly chooses
Si,k and Sj,k for k = 1, 2, . . . , L from Zq. He then calculates c′′i =
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and π′() is a permutation of {i, j}. The third party demonstrates that
D(c′′i ) and D(c
′′
j ) is a permutation of D(c
′
i) and D(c
′
j) without revealing
the permutation by proving
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logg(
∏
L
k=1(a
′′
i,k/a
′
i,k)
tk
∏
L
k=1(a
′′
j,k/a
′
j,k)
t′k) =
logy1y2(
∏
L
k=1(b
′′
i,1/b
′
i,1)
tk
∏
L
k=1(b
′′
j,1/b
′
j,1)
t′k) (4)
∨ logg(
∏
L
k=1(a
′′
i,k/a
′
j,k)
tk
∏
L
k=1(a
′′
j,k/a
′
i,k)
t′k) =
logy1y2(
∏
L
k=1(b
′′
i,1/b
′
j,1)
tk
∏
L
k=1(b
′′
j,1/b
′
i,1)
t′k)
where tk and t′k are short integers randomly chosen by the originator.
Proof (4) can be implemented using ZK proof of equality of logarithm [5]
and ZK proof of partial knowledge [6]. The proof can be publicly verified
by anyone.
(c) The originator verifies the third party’s proof, then performs CC(c′′i , c
′′
j )
with him.
The winning bid can be found by repeated comparisons of the encrypted bids
in pair. For example, in a first bid auction, the ciphertext containing a larger
bid in c′′i and c
′′
j is compared in the next comparison with a ciphertext which
has not been compared. After n − 1 such comparisons, the highest bid is
found as the winning bid. After the winning bid is found, the originator and
the third party cooperate to decrypt it. The winner can claim his winning
by revealing his bid and encryption details. If no bidder claims to be the
winner, the originator and the third party cooperate recover the shuffling of
the winning bid to trace it back to its submitted format. As each submitted
bid is signed by the bidder, the winner cannot deny he submitted the winning
bid.
6 Analysis
The winning bid is determined through ciphertext comparison. Before each en-
crypted bid is compared, it is re-encrypted and shuffled by both the origina-
tor and the third party. As the re-encryption and shuffling have been publicly
verified to be correct, no bid is tampered with before the comparison. As the
ciphertext comparison technique in [16] is correct and sound, the comparison of
the encrypted bids finds the winning bid.
As the private key is shared between the originator and the third party, no
losing bid is decrypted if they do not collude. As the modified encryption al-
gorithm in this paper is semantically secure, no information about the losing
bids is revealed before they are compared if the originator and the third party
do not collude. The ciphertext comparison technique in [16] is private, so no
information about the bids is revealed in each comparison of ciphertext pair
except which ciphertext in the pair contains a larger message. As each pair of
bids are shuffled by the originator and the third party before they are compared,
each comparison does not reveal which bid is larger although it can find the
ciphertext containing the larger bid. So no information about the losing bids is
revealed in the comparison if the originator and the third party do not collude.
Therefore, the new mobile agent scheme achieves data confidentiality and pri-
vacy. Note that shuffling of each compared bids is very important for the sake of
privacy. Wihtout the shuffling, ranking of all the bids is publicly known, which
compromises privacy.
Table 1. Comparison
Schemes Data confi- Anonymity Privacy Advantegs of Implemen-
-dentiality mobile agent -tation
Mix network
[19, 20] No Incomplete Incomplete Inconsistent not implemented
New Yes No Complete Consistent Completely
scheme implemented
The new private bidding mobile agent is compared against the existing pri-
vate bidding mobile agents [19, 20] in Table 1. Efficiency advantage of the new
private mobile agent is demonstrated in Table 2 where first bid auction is run.
[19] is not included in Table 2 as [20] is an optimisation of [19]. In Table 2, full-
length exponentiations are counted in terms of computation, while full-length
integers are counted in terms of communication. In Table 2, n is the number of
servers and L is the bit-length of the bids. Usually, L is a small integer, while
n is much larger. Comparisons in the two tables show that the new private bid-
ding mobile agent scheme is more efficient and provides better service than the
existing private bidding mobile agent schemes.
7 Conclusion
Possible methods to implement privacy in network communication are analysed
and compared. As a result, DCSC, a privacy mechanism never employed in
mobile agent schemes before, is demonstrated to be the appropriate mechanism
to implement privacy in mobile agent schemes. DCSC privacy in bidding mobile
agent scheme is designed and analysed to demonstrate the advantages of DCSC
privacy in mobile agent schemes.
Table 2. Efficiency advantage
[20] The new scheme
computation communication computation communication
recoverable anonymous ciphertext
anonymity and encryption
encryption channel comparison
2n2 + 4n not mentioned n2(n+ 1) 2nL (13L+ 2) n(n− 1)L
but inefficient (n− 1)
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